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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
JURIES IN INFERIOR COURTS
Magistrate court: At common law one was not entitled to
have a jury pass upon his rights in what is now designated as
a magistrate court. But Sections 43-93 et seq. and 43-115
et seq. give the right upon demand by either party in civil
and criminal cases respectively. In the latter cases even the
prosecutrix may exercise the right. Justice Pope in State v.
Nash (1897), 51 S. C. 319, 28 S. E. 946, at page 321 said:
The next question relates to the empanelling a jury at
the demand of the prosecutrix, and against the protest of
the defendant. Section 884 of the Civil Statutes of South
Carolina, vol. 1, of the Revised Statutes of this State,
1893, provides that either party to a trial before a magis-
trate shall be entitled to a jury. The only question under
this Section is, -is a prosecutor a "party to a suit?"
If the State, who is a party, should demand a jury, it
would necessarily make known such demand by some one
who represents the State. If the attorney general or so-
licitor had been present, a demand by either one of them
for a trial by jury would have been recognized as a de-
mand therefor by the State. Why may not the prosecutrix
represent the State, in making demand for a jury trial?
This, no doubt, was the view entertained by the Circuit
Judge, and I cannot find any error in such view.
In civil cases not only is either party entitled to the right
of a statutory jury of six upon demand but if he "refuses
to pay in advance the costs of summoning and paying jurors"
such a refusal will not be deemed a waiver since the right
is not conditioned upon such payment. Pinckney v. Green
(1903), 67 S. C. 309, 45 S. E. 202.
Can women serve on juries in magistrate courts? Section
43-94, as to civil cases, does not use the word "male" when
referring to whom may "be selected, but Section 43-116, as
to criminal cases, provides that the appointed officer "shall
write and fold up eighteen ballots, each containing the name
of a respectable (emphasis added) voter of the vicinity."
Women can now vote. They are no less respectable than men,
to say the least. Why aren't the names of some of them writ-
ten on some of the "ballots" prepared for a magistrate court
trial? Or why doesn't the legislature change the language
of the Section to conform to the times?
[Vol. II
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Drawing a jury in a Magistrate Court: As stated above the
constable has to furnish the names of only "respectable vot-
ers" of the vicinity in criminal cases. In civil cases, however,
Section 43-94 which didn't exist prior to the 1952 Code, pro-
vides that the constable shall furnish each side with a list
of 18 jurors, numbered from 1 to 18, such jurors to be "drawn
and selected by ballot from the whole number of jurors who
are drawn." The Section nowhere says when that "whole
number" is to be drawn, how many are to be included; or
where and in what kind of container the names are to be
kept, whether they are just to be "respectable voters" or
qualified electors.
The writer is informed that in applying that Section in
the magistrate court in the City of Columbia, the constable
selects the names of a few more than 18 male persons. These
he checks with the county registration books so as to ascer-
tain who of the selected number are qualified electors. He
puts 18 names of those so qualified on the striking list, copies
of which are handed to the attorneys, he keeping the original
for recording the strikes.
Whichever of the above sections apply, trouble can arise
as has happened in the past. If all strikes are used, and the
constable goes out to summon the 6 who are to serve, he
might find one or even two who are away, or sick, and unless
the parties agree to go ahead with the five or four as a
jury, the constable must make out another list of three times
the number deficient. After each side has struck alternately,
he goes out to summon the one or two who are to serve as
jurors, hoping that he will be successful. Sometimes continu-
ances would result; always there was a waste of time.
As already noted Section 43-116, which is the law as brought
over from the 1942 Code, then Section 3711 and which ap-
plied to both civil and criminal cases, governs only criminal
cases now. That section provides for taking care of a defi-
ciency in the event, when the constable goes out to summon
the 6 jurors, one or more can't be found or are unable to
serve.
However, Section 43-94 makes no provision for putting
three or six more names on a later striking list so that a
jury of six can finally be obtained. One asks oneself: what is
the constable to do in the event he can get only four or five
of the six first selected? Since Section 43-94 gives no answer,
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and the question must be answered when the occasion re-
quires, the logical conclusion is that new Section 43-94 and
old Section 43-116 will have to be construed together, where
they do not conflict, in order to get a practical, definite, well-
rounded procedure.
Judge DuPxe of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
in Columbia started a practice when Columbia magistrate
which tends toward trial efficiency. In order to save time
and not have to put off a trial, -the jury list of 18 was handed
out to the attorneys of each side several days prior to the
selecting of. the jury. Instead of waiting until the day of
trial, on a day agreed upon the attorneys came in and struck
the jury.
He said that the practice began because of the feasibility
of each side only taking five strikes, thereby leaving one
name on each side as an alternate in the event that, when
the constable goes out to get the striken jury in, if there
is one or even two who can't serve, or whom he can't find,
the court then has leeway and can still get a jury of six, be-
cause the constable can serve the seventh juror or the seventh
and eighth, thus causing a required jury of six to report on
the trial day. This procedure is still followed by the present
Columbia magistrate.
Municipal court: In drawing trial juries in municipal courts
the writer is informed that there are minor variations
throughout the state, hence an attorney has to ascertain what
is the particular method used in any given city. However,
the basic steps are set forth in the Code. Articles 2 to 7,
Chapter 6 of the Code, beginning at page 602 will have to be
studied when dealing with any municipal court. And Section
15-1013 must be kept in mind when a child under 17 years
of age is being investigated; likewise Section 15-1314 as to
certain cases in the children's court of Greenville County.
Courts of the City of Charleston are dealt with in a separate
Chapter, namely Chapter 9. For juries for the several courts
in that city one must refer to Articles 1 and 2 of that chapter.
Municipal Courts, more often referred to as recorder's
courts, are of much longer standing and hence the code sec-
tions pertaining thereto have been before the Supreme Court
quite often. But the sections dealing with the other inferior
courts, being of rather recent origin, have only in rare in-
[Vol. 11
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stances been before the highest court, and hence all that
one can do, when practicing in any of those courts, is to study
and analyze carefully their respective code sections from
15-1101 thru 15-1619, thence go to general authorities, such
as C. J. S., to ascertain what, if anything, has been adjudi-
cated in other jurisdictions.
Municipal courts have had their powers construed quite
often by the Supreme Court and hence there is the added re-
sponsibility of checking and studying the annotations to their
respective Code sections.
It should be noted that Section 15-901 gives to intenrents
and mayors "all the powers and authority of magistrates n
criminal cases . . . " This would appear to empower such
officers to try a criminal case involving the violation of a state
statute. However, the Supreme Court gave a strict interpre-
tation to the above quoted language and held that such power
did not extend beyond authority to try offenses involving
the violation of city ordinances. Keels v. Sumter (1913), 95
S. C. 203, 78 S. E. 893. Section 15-1010, as to the powers of
recorders in cities of 1500 and not over 50,000 has similar
language but has not as yet been construed. However, there
can be little, if any, doubt that the identical construction,
would be placed upon it as was given to the similar language
in the Keels case, supra.
In checking the code sections relative to any inferior court,
watch out for differences as to time periods in which any
judicial step must be taken, and also as to whom is to be
served. For example, in appealing from certain municipal
or recorders' courts, one must serve on the recorder notice
of appeal, and such service must be within 24 hours after
sentence or judgment. Section 15-1017. This is a very short
time in which to act, but like other time periods for appealing,
it would seem that the municipal court would have no power
to extend the time. The statutory time limitation would be
mandatory; hence, any attorney must be very careful and
not delay.
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